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CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING PROPORTIONALITY IN 
NONCAPITAL SENTENCING* 
by Steven Grossman 
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law 
There has always been debate about 
how, why and to what extent society 
should punish individuals who violate 
its norms. In this country that debate 
has been conducted on primarily two 
levels. First, in legislatures and among 
punishment theorists the debate has 
revolved around what are the appro-
priate goals of a criminal justice sys-
tem and how can a sentencing frame-
work be developed to best accomplish 
those goals. Second, in the courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, the 
debate has involved the meaning of 
the ban on cmel and unusual punish-
ment contained within the Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
This issue of CRJMINAL PRACTICE 
LAW REPORT examines the Supreme 
Court ' s treatment of the Eighth 
Amendment with respect to claims of 
excessiveness regarding prison sen-
tences. Specifically, it addresses the 
issue of whether and to what degree 
the Eighth Amendment requires that 
a punishment not be disproportional 
to the crime punished. In analyzing 
all of the modern holdings of the 
Court in this area, one finds signifi-
cant fault with each. The result of this 
series of flawed opinions from the 
Supreme Court is that the state of the 
*Adapted by permission from 84 Ky. L. J. 
107 (1 995). 
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law with respect to proportionality in 
sentencing is confused, and what law 
can be discerned rests on weak foun-
dations. 
Rummel v. Estelle 
The modern approach to the applica-
tion of an Eighth Amendment-based 
proportionality principle for prison 
sentences began with the Supreme 
Court's holding in Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263 (1980). Rummel was 
sentenced under a Texas recidivist 
statute that required life imprisonment 
for anyone convicted of a felony. He 
argued that such a sentence was dis-
proportionate to the offense of which 
he was convicted or even to the three 
aggregate felonies that were used to 
trigger the recidivist statute. 
Rummel was convicted by a jury 
in 1973 of theft, for obtaining $120.75 
by false pretenses. Under the relevant 
Texas statute, theft of more than $50 
was punishable by two to ten years in 
prison. The state, however, chose to 
prosecute Rummel under the Texas 
felony recidivist statute. The two pre-
vious felony convictions offered by 
the state were a 1964 plea of guilt to 
fraudulently using a credit card to 
obtain $80 worth of services and a 
1969 plea to passing a forged check 
of $28.36. Rummel had received 
is pub lish ed by Clark Boardman Callaghan, 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014. 
prison terms of three and four years 
respectively for these two prior con-
victions. After his 1973 conviction, 
the trial judge imposed the life sen-
tence mandated by the recidivist 
statute. 
The Supreme Court concluded that 
setting the maximum length of prison 
sentences for criminal offenses is a 
role properly handled by legislatures 
and not appellate courts . The Court 
based this conclusion both on its per-
ception of how the Eighth Amend-
ment has previously been interpreted 
by the Court in this realm and on its 
view of the proper role of judges in 
the sentencing process. In both of 
these areas, the Court began a series 
ofunpersuasive and unfortunate opin-
ions with respect to the application of 
the principle of proportionality in sen-
tencing. 
The Court in Rummel divided its 
. . . the state of 
the law with 
respect to 
proportionality 
in sentencing is 
confused ... 
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analysis of its previous holdings involving Eighth 
Amendment proportionality into death penalty cases and 
those involving imprisonment. As to the former, the Court 
concluded that since death is a unique form of punish-
ment, previous Supreme Court decisions in capital cases 
that had clearly discerned a proscription against dispro-
portional sentencing within the Eighth Amendment were 
"oflimited assistance" in assessing whether jail sentences 
could be impermissibly long. Regarding noncapital cases, 
the Court said that successful challenges to the propor-
tionality of such sentences were "exceedingly rare" and, 
in fact, analyzed only one such case, Weems v. U.S., 217 
u.s. 349 (1910). 
Decided in 1910, Weems was the first opinion of the 
Supreme Court that clearly identified a requirement for 
proportional sentencing within the Eighth Amendment. 
Weems, a disbursing officer for the Coast Guard, sta-
tioned in the Philippines, was convicted of falsifying a 
cash book in the amount of 616 pesos. For this offense, 
Weems received a fine plus fifteen years of a punish-
ment called "cadena temporal." During the cadena, the 
prisoner is chained from the ankles and wrists and forced 
to perform what the Court called "hard and painful la-
bor," 217 U.S. at 364. Even after the incarceration pe-
riod is over, the offender has no marital authority, nei-
ther parental nor property rights, and is subject to life-
long surveillance. 
Weems claimed that his punishment was cruel and 
unusual because of its harshness and oppressiveness, 
and because the length of the sentence was dispropor-
tionate to the offense he committed. In its decision 
that his sentence was violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court seemed to accept both of 
Weems' rationales. 
The Court in Rummel, while acknowledging that the 
earlier holding had found Weems' sentence to be dispro-
portional to his offense, attributed this finding primarily 
to the "unique" nature of the cadena punishment and not 
its length. The Weems opinion was characterized by the 
Court ii.1 Rummel as "consistently referring jointly to the 
length of imprisonment and its 'accessories' of 'accom-
paniments'," 445 U.S. at 272, 273. 
The analysis of Weems undertaken by the Court in 
Rummel is deficient in that it omits those aspects of the 
earlier holding that support the position that Weems' sen-
tence was violative of the Eighth Amendment for two 
separate reasons, its length and its harshness. Further-
more, the Court placed no weight on those parts of the 
decision in Weems that declared proportionality to be an 
essential component of the Eighth Amendment without 
alluding to the nature or uniqueness of the cadena sen-
tence. Thus, while Weems may not be a definitive hold-
ing that length of imprisonment alone can make a sen-
tence unconstitutionally disproportionate to an offense, 
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it offers far stronger support for this position than is sug-
gested by the Court in Rummel. 
The Court in Rummel was similarly dismissive of the 
relevance of those cases involving capital punishment 
that had clearly identified a proportionality principle in 
the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 
153 (1976), which held that the death penalty was con-
stitutional at least in certain circumstances, and Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. at 584 (1977), holding that capital 
punishment is disproportionate to the crime of raping an 
adult woman, had both been decided only a few years 
before Rummel. Each of these decisions held that pun-
ishments excessive in relation to the crimes committed 
were violative of the proportionality requirement of the 
Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, each decision made 
clear that excessiveness alone, without regard to the bar-
baric nature of the punishment, was sufficient to invali-
date a sentence. The Court in Rummel found these pro-
nouncements on excessiveness, because they appeared 
in capital cases, to be "of limited assistance" in deciding 
the constitutionality of terms of imprisonment 
Assuming arguendo both that the death penalty is a 
unique form of punishment and the questionable notion 
that the Court's pronouncements in capital cases have 
no bearing on other sentences, the Court in Rummel was 
still remiss in ignoring the manner in which those capital 
cases interpreted earlier proportionality holdings of the 
Court. Such an omission is particularly glaring when 
those earlier proportionality cases did not themselves 
involve capital sentences. 
The Rummel Court was also understandably concerned 
with the possibility that appellate judges might use a pro-
portional sentencing requirement to substitute their views 
as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence in a given 
case for that of the trial judge or the legislature. Rummel 
attempted to demonstrate that his sentence should be 
deemed unconstitutionally excessive through the appli-
cation of reasonably objective criteria, arguing that both 
the fact that his crimes were nonviolent and that indi-
vidually or even collectively the crimes involved rela-
tively small amounts of money were objective evidence 
of the nonserious nature of his crimes. The Court, how-
ever, considered the seriousness of any crime to be an 
inherently subjective question and regarded it as a mat-
ter for each state to determine, according to its particular 
needs and interests. In this instance, said the Court, Texas 
was responding primarily to the problem of recidivism 
and not merely the specific crimes for which Rummel 
was convicted. Once recidivist statutes are deemed to be 
rational responses to the problem of repeat offenders (and 
Rummel did not challenge this), how the statute is struc-
tured is a matter of line-drawing, according to the Court 
Regarding such line-drawing to be a legislative function, 
the Court rejected Rummel's attempt to fashion a judi-
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cial approach to assess the excessiveness of a legisla-
tively sanctioned sentence. 
The judicial struggle over the application of the Eighth 
Amendment to proportional sentencing was thus to be 
fought primarily on two fronts: interpretation of earlier 
Supreme Court cases (and later, other historical sources) 
and the existence of criteria that meaningfully objectify 
an appellate court's determination as to whether a par-
ticular sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime 
committed. 
Hutto v. Davis 
The first time after Rummel that the Supreme Court had 
the opportunity to confront an Eighth Amendment pro-
portionality challenge to a noncapital sentence was the 
case of Roger Trenton Davis, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
370 (1982). Davis had been sentenced by a jury in Vir-
ginia to a total of forty years imprisonment and a fine of 
$20,000, based on his convictions for distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute a total of nine ounces 
of marijuana. 
In reversing the holding of the Fourth Circuit that 
Davis' sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court wrote a terse per curiam opinion that 
appeared to foreclose virtually any proportionality chal-
lenge in a noncapital case. The Court observed that the 
decision in Rummel had made clear that any assessment 
of the excessiveness of a prison term was inherently sub-
jective and therefore "purely a matter of legislative pre-
rogative," 454 U.S. at 373. The per curiam opinion reit-
erated that because of the unique nature of the death pen-
alty, the Court's pronouncements regarding 
proportionality requirements in capital cases had little 
relevance outside that realm. Furthermore, the Court 
noted that in Rummel it had rejected each of the pur-
ported objectifying criteria that had been relied upon by 
the district court in granting the writ. The Court in Davis, 
again reiterating what it held in Rummel, warned that 
successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences 
should be "exceedingly rare" and offered life imprison-
ment for overtime parking as an example of such an ex-
traordinary situation. 
Justice Brennan, writing for three dissenters, argued 
that while the language in Rummel may be expansive, its 
holding is limited to the premise that Texas had validly 
chosen to punish habitual offenders severely in order to 
have a strong deterrent impact on prospective recidivists. 
In citing approvingly prior decisions such as Weems, the 
Court in Rummel, according to Brennan, did not advo-
cate abandonment of all disproportionality analysis. To 
Brennan, a sentence of forty years imprisonment, roughly 
thirteen times greater than the average for others in Vir-
ginia convicted of the same crimes, is grossly dispropor-
tionate to the crimes of distributing and possessing nine 
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ounces of marijuana. Justice Powell, who authored a dis-
sent in Rummel, also believed that Davis' sentence was 
disproportional to his crimes but felt constrained by the 
holding in Rummel to concur in this case. 
Thus, something of a three way division among the 
justices developed in Davis with respect to how to ap-
proach proportionality challenges. It is difficult to dis-
cern clearly whether this division was one of degree or 
one of kind. The majority apparently believed that such 
challenges should rarely, if ever, be successful, using 
again the never-in-a lifetime example of life imprison-
ment for overtime parking. To Justice Powell, discern-
ing whether such a "rare" situation exists apparently de-
pends on whether the offense and sentence in the chal-
lenged case are more disprop01tionate than those involved 
in Rummel's case (and presumably hereafter in Davis' 
case as well). The dissenters seem to regard Rummel as 
limited to recidivist statutes and would apparently advo-
cate that appellate courts in other cases should engage in 
proportionality analysis in keeping with the Eighth 
Amendment's "evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society," quoting from Trap v. 
Dulles, 350 U.S. at 101 (1958). 
Davis was particularly noteworthy because the Su-
preme Court had held that a sentence of forty years in-
carceration for possession and distribution of nine ounces 
of marijuana was not violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
As Davis was not sentenced under a recidivist statute, 
the focus of any analysis had to be the particular crime 
committed. If such a lengthy sentence for the sale of a 
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not deemed disproportional, it is hard to imagine a sen-
tence that would be so viewed by the Court. At least it 
was until one year later when the Court decided Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S . at 277 (1983). 
Solem v. Helm 
Jerry Helm was convicted of uttering a no account check 
in 1979, a felony under South Dakota law. The maxi-
mum sentence for that crime ordinarily was five years 
incarceration and a $5000 fine. Helm, however, was sen-
tenced under South Dakota's recidivist statute, which 
imposed life imprisonment upon conviction of a fourth 
felony. A companion statute prohibited parole for those 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Unlike the opinion of 
the Court in Rummel, Justice Powell, speaking for the 
Court in Helm, saw no ambiguity in Weems with respect 
to its endorsement of an Eighth Amendment-based pro-
portionality requirement. Powell identified further sup-
port for a proportionality requirement in other, later cases 
decided by the Court. Robinson v. California, 337 U.S. 
660 (1962); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
While conceding that in both Rummel and Davis the Court 
had indicated that proportionality challenges to the length 
of jail sentences would rarely be successful, Justice Powell 
interpreted both decisions as leaving the door somewhat 
open to such challenges. In confronting the language in 
Rummel that seemed to foreclose proportionality challenges 
to the length of sentences, Justice Powell offered an inter-
pretation that is at best unpersuasi ve and perhaps somewhat 
disingenuous. The Court in Rummel wrote that, "one could 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable 
as felonies ... the length of sentence actually imposed is 
purely a matter of legislative prerogative," 445 U.S. at 274. 
Speaking for the Court in Helm, Justice Powell imposed on 
the words "one could argue" an interpretation that is literal 
to the extreme. To Powell, the Court in Rummel with these 
words "did not adopt the standard proposed but merely rec-
ognized that the argument was possible," 463 U.S. at 288 n. 
14. In addition, Justice Powell apparently ignored the words 
that followed, "without fear of contradiction." Taken to-
gether, these words hardly support Justice Powell's inter-
pretation that the Court in Rummel was apparently posing a 
hypothetical argument. However, apparently unwilling to 
hold that the Court was wrong in Rummel when it declared 
that appellate courts have no role in ensuring that sentences 
are proportional, Justice Powell and the majority in Helm 
were forced into this interpretation. 
Some method then must be devised, according to Jus-
tice Powell, to assess the proportionality of a sentence to 
the offense committed. Principally, this method must to 
some extent objectify the proportionality determination 
so that it does not become merely a reflection of the per-
20 
sonal predilections of each appellate judge. With this in 
mind, Justice Powell offered objectifying criteria that the 
Court had used in other cases for assessing the constitu-
tionality of a sentence. ( 
First, Powell advocated looking to the nature of the 
crime and its seriousness. Second, the Court regarded as 
"helpful" a comparison between the sentence at issue and 
sentences for similar or more serious crimes in the sub-
ject jurisdiction. Third, the Court viewed as "useful" a 
comparison between the sentence at hand and that which 
offenders receive for the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In discussing the above objectifying criteria, Jus-
tice Powell unfortunately and perhaps necessarily omit-
ted the analysis of those factors that was performed by 
the Court in Rummel. In that case, as well as in Davis, 
the Court's analysis led to a specific rejection of the three 
factors adopted by the Court in Helm . 
However, the Court in Helm did take issue with the 
assertion in these earlier decisions that an assessment of 
the seriousness of a crime was too subjective a determi-
nation to inform a decision as to the proportionality of a 
sentence. The Court pointed out that based on clearly 
established principles, it is well accepted that certain 
crimes are considered more serious than others. Without 
enunciating all such principles, the Court said that seri-
ousness can be determined by looking to, among other 
things, the harm caused by the crime, the use or threat to 
use violence, the intent of the criminal, whether a crime 
is a lesser included offense, and whether the criminal is 
a principal or merely an accessory after the fact. 
In addressing the criticism of the use of the factor that 
compares sentences among other jurisdictions, the Court in 
Helm acknowledged that under our federalist system, some 
states would invariably impose harsher sentences forcer-
tain crimes. However, this does not justify dismissing this 
factor, according to the Court, but argues for the use of a 
combination of factors with no one alone determining 
disproportionality. Having defended its adoption of the three 
objectifying criteria, what remained for the Court was to 
apply the factors to Helm's crime and punishment. 
In applying the first objectifying factor, the gravity of · 
the crime, the Court noted that Helm's crime of uttering 
a no account check for $100 was '"one of the most pas-
sive felonies a person could commit' ," 463 U.S. at 296. 
The crime was completely nonviolent and involved a 
relatively small amount of money. Although acknowl-
edging that it was proper to sentence Helm for his past 
crimes as well, the Court regarded these prior crimes also 
as "relatively minor." Notably absent from the Court's 
assessment of the gravity of Helm's crimes was any com-
parison between the seriousness of Helm's criminal 
record and that of Rummel. This omission is particularly 
glaring as the Court's assessment of the harshness of 
Helm's sentence relied significantly on a comparison to 
Rummel's sentence. Perhaps this omission occurred be- the rehabilitative project," 463 U.S. at 300, usually embody-
cause, in the words of the dissent, "by comparison ing specific procedures and standards. While one may le-
Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen'," 463 U.S. at gitimately have an expectation of parole at some time, the 
304 (Burger, C.J., diss' g). granting of executive clemency, according to the Court, was 
In comparing South Dakota's treatment of other com- purely ad hoc. The Court further noted that South Dakota in 
parable and more serious crimes, the next objectifying fact had rarely commuted life sentences and even if com-
factor, the Court noted that only crimes far more serious mutation occurred, that would only make Helm eligible for 
than Helm's, such as murder or kidnapping, could result parole. 
in life imprisonment. Acknowledging that Helm's sen- The distinction drawn by the Court in Helm between 
tence as a recidivist compelled it to con- ,----------------, parole and commutation through executive 
sider his prior crimes as well, the Court ... serzousness clemency, based on their respective like-
maintained that even for second or third lihoods, is a reasonable one. It would skew 
time felons to receive life imprisonment, [for purposes of an attempt to apportion crime to punish-
the crimes at issue had to befar graver than proportionality ment were the Court to ignore the differ-
those committed by Helm. While this may ence between a sentence that will likely 
be true, it could be argued that the state review J can be result in the defendant's release and one 
has related but somewhat separate goals determined by for which the possibility of release is just 
in incarcerating for life someone who, by one step beyond the theoretical. What is 
being convicted of seven felonies in eleven looking to, debatable is the Court's assertion in Helm 
years, has demonstrated complete disre- among other that the opinion in Rummel "relied 
gard for society's laws. Such a goal can things, the harm heavily" on Rummel's possible parole. 
take the form of general deterrence, by The Court in Rummel specifically re-
communicating to other potential recidi- caused by the jected the state's attempt to treat Rummel's 
vists that there is a limit to their felonious crime, the use or sentence as something less than life im-
criminal activity. It can take the form of prisonment because of the possibility of 
retribution or just desserts by making the threat to use parole. It did, however, note that an as-
societal statement that those who continu- violence, the sessment of Rummel's sentence "could 
ously ignore our laws against committing hardly ignore" the possibility of release 
nonpetty crimes deserve to be incarcerated intent of the and this possibility distinguished Texas' 
for life. While neither of these goals nee- criminal, statute from one that contains no parole 
essarily justify the specific sentence in possibility. 
Helm's case, the Court should have con- whether a crime The result of the holdings in Rummel, 
sidered these traditional sentencing goals. is a lesser Davis and Helm was to send a mixed and 
In applying the final objectifying fac- confusing message with respect to the Su-
tor, the Court in Helm adopted the finding included offense, preme Court's approach to the requirement 
of the Court of Appeals that in only one and whether the of proportional sentencing. Reconciling the 
other state could Helm, as a recidivist, have criminal is a three holdings, all still deemed by the Court 
received life imprisonment for the crime to be good law, was no easy task for lower 
he committed. principal or courts attempting to assess proportionality 
After concluding that each of the three merely an challenges. Is there a clear proscription 
objectifying criteria pointed to the against grossly disproportionate sentences; 
disproportionality of Helm's sentence, the accessory after to what types of cases does this proscription 
Court turned to the severity of the sentence the fact. apply; and how do we assess such challenges 
itself. Specifically, the Court rejected the were all questions that seemed to produce 
state's attempt to compare Helm's sentence different answers when looking at Rummell 
with the sentence received by Rummel. The Court noted Davis as opposed to Helm. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that under Texas law Rummel was eligible for parole, and that eight years after Helm was decided the Court again 
that parole could be granted as early as ten years into his waded into the proportionality morass. 
sentence and could be reasonably expected in twelve years. 
Under South Dakota law, Helm had no possibility of parole 
and could be released only through executive clemency. The 
Court in Helm regarded the distinction between the possi-
bility of parole and commutation through clemency to be 
"fundamental." It viewed the former as a "regular part of 
21 
Harmelin v. Michigan 
InHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Harmelin 
was convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine 
under a Michigan law that mandated life imprisonment 
without parole for possessing a large amount of drugs. 
In the Supreme Court, five justices joined in Justice 
Scalia's opinion holding that while severe mandatory 
punishments could be considered cruel, they were not 
historically unusual. These justices agreed that the obli-
gation that exists in capital cases for the sentencer to 
consider all mitigating facts related to the crime and the 
offender does not apply to noncapital sentences. Con-
trary to the defendant's assertion that as with capital pun-
ishment, life imprisonment without parole is a unique 
sentence, the Court held that such a sentence is actually 
more similar to other sentences of life imprisonment. 
Therefore, according to a majority of the Court, no spe-
cial protection such as the requirement to consider miti-
gating factors applied to sentences such as that received 
by Harmelin. Unfortunately for courts that would have 
to wrestle with proportionality challenges in the future, 
the members of the Court agreed on little else. 
The same five justices agreed that Harmelin's sentence 
was not grossly disproportionate to his crime but disagreed 
among themselves on such critical issues as why the sen-
tence was constitutional, whether the Eighth Amendment 
contains any meaningful limitation on noncapital sentences 
and how appellate courts should handle future challenges 
to the excessiveness of prison sentences due to their length. 
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Scalia's opin-
ion, which construed both Anglo-American history and ju-
dicial precedent as evidence of the fact that the Eighth 
Amendment contains no prohibition on grossly dispropor-
tionate prison sentences. 
Justice Scalia took issue with the historical analysis 
in Helm. Specifically, he rejected the notion that the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained 
in the English Declaration of Rights had anything to do 
with disproportionate punishments. Regarding the debate 
surrounding the proper interpretation of Weems, Scalia 
concluded that the holding in that case is ambiguous and 
provides no clear-cut basis for the existence of a propor-
tionality principle within the Eighth Amendment. As the 
Court did in Rummel, Justice Scalia regarded previous 
decisions that required proportionality assessments in 
capital cases to be limited to just such cases. 
The only Supreme Court case that Justice Scalia be-
lieved clearly identified a principle of proportionality was 
Solem v. Helm. As to Helm's elaboration of a proportion-
ality principle, Justice Scalia concluded that the Court 
was "simply wrong." According to Justice Scalia, it was 
wrong regarding its explanation of the genesis of the 
Eighth Amendment, wrong in its interpretation of Weems 
and wrong because it misread the holdings in Rummel 
and Davis. 
In addition, Justice Scalia addressed the wisdom of 
employing such a principle in noncapital cases by exam-
ining the three objectifying factors for assessing propor-
tionality that were used by the Court in Helm. Assessing 
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the first factor, Justice Scalia acknowledges that crimes 
of violence will always be deemed to be serious in na-
ture. The problem he sees is with determining what other 
crimes are serious and assessing how serious they are 
compared to some violent crimes. This determination, 
according to Justice Scalia, is inherently subjective and 
not susceptible to objective analysis. 
The inability to assess objectively the seriousness of a 
crime, Scalia reasoned, results as well in the failure of the 
second of Helms objectifying factors. As one crime cannot 
be deemed to be objectively more serious than another, ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, it is fruitless to look for other crimes 
to use as vehicles for comparison. To Justice Scalia, differ-
ential treatment by a state of two arguably serious crimes 
merely means that the legislature, for any of a number of 
appropriate reasons, perceives greater danger in one type of 
serious crime than it does in another. It is not the function 
of the courts in such situations, according to Justice 
Scalia, to substitute their judgment for that of the duly 
elected representatives of the people regarding which 
crime is more serious. 
As for Helm's third objectifying factor, Justice Scalia 
concedes that comparing how other states punish the 
crime at issue can be done with "clarity and ease." He 
contends, however, that such a comparison has no bear-
ing on an Eighth Amendment challenge. Justice Scalia's 
view, mirroring that expressed by the Court in Rummel, 
is that our principles of federalism permit, if not encour-
age, such differential treatment of crimes based on the 
different interests of the states involved. 
Justice Scalia is correct in his observation that defin-
ing seriousness involves a significant amount of subjec-
tivity and in his recognition of the fact tl1at a federalist 
system will inevitably result in disparate treatment of 
crimes in different jurisdictions. Open to question; how-
ever, is his conclusion that these observations negate the 
effectiveness of the objectifying factors. While each of 
Scalia's points illustrates that no precise calculus of what 
constitutes a constitutional prison length can be drawn 
from the objectifying factors, neither of them negates 
the ability of the factors to point to sentences that are 
grossly disproportional to the crimes committed. 
Justice Scalia was able to garner the support of only 
one other member of the Court for his approach to pro-
portionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and two other jus-
tices, joined Scalia only in the judgment upholding 
Harmelin's sentence and in that portion of Scalia's opin-
ion rejecting the defendant's claim that his sentence was 
invalid because it was not individualized. 
The opinion of Justice Kennedy is significant for a 
variety of reasons. First it makes clear that a majority of 
the justices accept the existence of at least some form of 
proportionality principle contained within the Eighth 
Amendment for both capital and noncapital sentences. conscionable, it is "not our discretion but our duty" to 
While acknowledging that Helm takes a different ap- interfere, as the Court said in Weems, 217 U.S. at 378. 
proach to application of proportionality principles than While a standard of "gross disproportionality" will ap-
either Rummel or Davis, Justice Kennedy sees certain propriately require less frequent judicial intervention, 
common threads running through each of these cases. when required, such intervention is crucial, in part, be-
According to Justice Kennedy, the first principle to be cause of its infrequency. 
discerned from previous cases is the need for courts to defer Although Justice Kennedy's attempt to harmonize the 
to legislative judgments concerning what constitutes an ap- opinions of the Supreme Court in previous proportional-
propriate sentence for a particular crime. How and whether ity cases may be somewhat more persuasive than was 
a state wishes to punish an offense involve political deter- Justice Powell's attempt to do so in Helm, it raises many 
ruinations about the needs and interests of the state involved questions as welL Kennedy's conclusion that prior cases 
as well as critical judgments as to what goals ,-------------, are universal in their acceptance of a sen-
of punishment are to be used and in what ... while severe tencing proportionality principle, albeit a 
combination. Such matters to Kennedy are mandatory narrow one, is at least defensible. His as-
fundamentally legislative in nature. sertion, however, that the use of two of the 
The second principle Kennedy sees punishments three proportionality criteria adopted by 
emerging from previous cases is that leg- could be the Court in Helm is discretionary is far 
islatures are to use any of a number of less convincing. In Helm, the Court said 
punishment theories in structuring a sen- considered "it may be helpful to compare sentences 
tencing system. cruel, they were imposed on other criminals in the same 
Next, Kennedy determined that the jurisdiction" and "the courts may find it 
Court, through its previous holdings, had not historically useful" to engage in interjurisdictional 
recognized that disparate treatment of the unusual. comparison, 463 U.S. at 291. To Justice 
same crime by different states was an in- Kennedy this means that courts may also 
evitable byproduct of federalism. Differ- decide there is no need to engage in such 
ences regarding punishment of a particular offense are comparisons where there is no clear gross 
due to the variety of philosophies and concerns that un- disproportionality after assessing the seriousness of the 
derlie each state's sentencing system. To Justice Kennedy, offense and harshness of the punishment. This turned out 
this makes any interstate sentencing comparison an "im- to be a conclusion of some significance, as many courts 
perfect enterprise," 501 U.S. at 1000. faced with challenges to the proportionality of a sentence 
The final principle Justice Kennedy sees emerging after the decision in Harmelin have adopted Justice 
from the earlier cases is the importance of relying on Kennedy's approach. 
objective factors, where feasible, to assess proportional- Justice Kennedy's conditional approach to use of the 
ity. To Kennedy, the most important objective factor is comparative analyses criteria can be criticized as to its 
the type of punishment imposed. As the penalty of death efficacy as well. As Kennedy notes, one clear principle 
has long been viewed by the Court as unique, a clear line that emerges from the Court's previous holdings regard-
can be drawn between it and a sentence involving jail ing proportionality is that judicial determinations of the 
time. Justice Kennedy, however, does not discern such a excessiveness of a sentence should not be nor appear to 
clear line as existing between sentences involving shorter be merely the individual predilections of the judges in-
and longer periods of incarceration; courts should be ex- volved. exclusive use of the harshness of the crime 
ceedingly reluctant to entertain proportionality challenges cdteria (even if this one-criteria approach is used only 
to noncapital sentences. when there appears to be no gross disproportionality be-
Few would argue with Justice Kennedy's view ofleg- tween crime and sentence) runs counter to this principle. 
islative primacy in sentencing, the ability of each legis- As Justice White points out in his dissenting opinion in 
lature to use various sentencing theories in different com- Hannelin, it is far more subjective to base proportional-
binations or the inevitable result that some jurisdictions ity determinations on merely the view of the deciding 
will treat certain crimes more harshly than other juris- judges regarding the seriousness of the crime than it is to 
dictions. Merely recognizing these principles, however, have their judgment informed by the way in which the 
without acknowledging the important limits that attach state treats other criminals and how other states deal with 
to each, risks devaluing any proportionality requirement 
and making application less effective. 
The Eighth Amendment was designed specifically to 
check legislative excesses. While legislatures establish 
punishment schemes, when a particular sentence is un-
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the crime at issue. 
The problem in using only the seriousness of the crime 
criterion is evidenced by a look at how Kennedy applies 
his proportionality approach to Harmelin's crime and 
comparing it with Justice White's application of all three 
... 
criteria in his dissent. Justices Kennedy and White have 
a reasonable difference of opinion regarding the serious-
ness of possessing over 650 grams of cocaine. Although 
Kennedy regards the sentence of life without parole as 
harsh, he argues that Michigan has the right to determine 
that the goal of deterring possession of large amounts of 
cocaine warrants such a sentence. He rejects Harmelin's 
claim that drug possession should be regarded as a vic-
timless crime, and describes how the effects of drugs harm 
not only the user but society as well. 
Justice White, in his dissent, concedes that the use of 
drugs is serious, but not so serious as sale or possession 
with intent to sell, neither of which Harmelin was con-
victed of. White compares the collateral consequences 
of drugs, a factor upon which Justice Kennedy appears 
to rely heavily, to those of alcohol. Such consequences, 
White asserts, could lead to certain penalties but not to 
oppressively harsh ones. Furthermore, in a state such as 
Michigan, where there is no capital punishment, life im-
prisonment is the harshest punishment possible. To ap-
ply such a harsh punishment mandatorily, without regard 
to the fact that Harmelin is a first offender and without 
any suggestion that Harmelin's particular offense was 
especially egregious is even more problematic. 
In sum, Justice Kennedy and the two justices who join 
in his opinion view Harmelin's crime as more serious 
than do Justice White and the three other justices who 
join with him. Further, the views of both groups of jus-
tices seem to be reasonable. Under Justice Kennedy's 
approach, once the determination is made that no gross 
disproportionality exists based on an assessment of the 
seriousness of the crime, analysis stops. In such a situa-
tion the subjective views of the judges would appear to 
be not just a factor in the decision but the likely deter-
mining factor. It would be wiser to tum, as Justice White 
then does, to the two comparative analyses to inform any 
determination of gross disproportionality. 
In so doing Justice White observes that Michigan's harsh-
est penalty is reserved for only two other crimes, both of 
which are surely more serious than drug possession. Fur-
thermore, arguably more serious crimes against the person 
such as murder in the second degree, rape and armed rob-
bery do not carry mandatory life sentences. It is also signifi-
cant, according to Justice White, that Michigan is the only 
state in which a defendant could receive life without parole 
for possessing the amount of drugs Harmelin had. While 
this is certainly permissible under our federalist system, that 
Michigan treats Harmelin differently than would any other 
state informs an assessment of proportionality and even more 
obviously objectifies the assessment measurably. 
In the wake of Harmelin, following on the decisions 
in Rummel, Davis and Helm, a great deal of confusion 
exists respecting the application of a proportionality prin-
ciple to noncapital sentences. Much of that confusion 
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stems from the inability of the justices to agree upon and 
articulate clearly an Eighth Amendment proportionality 
principle, and from the mixed signals they have given 
with respect to how to apply such a principle. These prob-
lems derive from the Court's failure to develop a con-
vincing philosophical basis on which to premise a mean-
ingful ban on grossly disproportional punishments. 
Conclusion 
The time has come for the Supreme Court to make clear 
that it accepts the existence of a proportionality principle 
within the Eighth Amendment that applies to excessive 
prison sentences. While appellate courts should be re-
luctant to overturn legislatively sanctioned sentences and 
do so only when the sentences are grossly disproportion-
ate to the crime committed, cruel and unusual punish-
ments cannot be allowed to stand. 
The three-criteria approach advanced by the Court in 
Helm serves as a good foundation for assessing the 
disproportionality of a sentence. This approach offers 
judges the opportunity to evaluate the seriousness of an 
offense by examining such things as the consequences 
of the act and the moral wrongfulness of the actor. Addi-
tionally, it looks to the harshness of the sentence, con-
sidering all possible justifications for the sentence im-
posed. Finally, it requires comparisons of the crime and 
sentence to others within the subject state and in other 
states in order to objectify somewhat the conclusion as 
to disproportionality. This approach would allow trial 
judges to continue to be the principal sentencers, give 
them clearer guidance as to what is permissible under 
the Eighth Amendment and reduce the number of grossly 
excessive prison sentences that are inflicted. 
RECENT DECISION 
Wisconsin "Sexually Violent Person" Statute Upheld 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently held consti-
tutional as against due process and ex post facto chal-
lenges a state statute that provides for the involuntary 
commitment of individuals found to be "sexually vio-
lent persons." State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). 
A "sexually violent person" was defined as a person 
previously convicted of a violent sex offense "who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental dis-
order that makes it substantially probable that the person 
will engage in acts of sexual violence." The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found no double jeopardy problem ex-
isted because this statute's primary purpose was not pun-
ishment, retribution or deterrence, but instead protection 
of the public and treatment of high risk sex offenders. 
Similarly, it was held not to violate ex post facto prohi-
bitions because it serves "a legitimate, regulatory, 
nonpunitive function ." 
